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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 403, Utah Rule of Evidence. 
Rule 411, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 607, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The above captioned case is a personal injury action. 
The plaintiff, Douglas Butts, claims that as he was traveling up 
Sundance Canyon on his motorcycle he was forced off the road by 
the defendant, Gary Laney. Following a jury trial of the matter, 
which lasted from February 11 through February 14, 1991, the jury 
returned a no cause of action verdict in favor of the defendant, 
Gary Laney. Judgment on the verdict was entered by the court on 
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March b, 1991, Douglas Butts filed his notice of appear uu April 
J1, lr»*'»f 
RELEVANT FACTS 
This lawsuit ia .1 personal i n j nr \' claim whormn the 
j l i l M i t i l l it i I < "i|i", , l u l l I M M l i f t t - i i d i i i l l I II I 'I u "In 1 In f u d l ( 
c a u s i n g him p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s . (h ,' | The a c c i d e n t l i t e \i 
l o c a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y one mi le west of P r rvn r any r i , V 1 
( I IJ1 i|i 11 in in I I mi in 111 in i I I in in I mi mi ( iiJ|i 1o Sundance Ski Re- / D . 
3 . ) The road head ing trom Prove Canyon Road up t o Sun: .in-
na r row, winding road .iof 1 tin"1 a r v i d r n t n i t m N ' d ippi o\ 
w jy IjetwtM ii I In1 I i anyoii Road and 'Sundance. 
The plaintiff was driving a motorcycle up Sundance 
Canyon Road toward iunil.iiH a n h i l e dnf r nd iiiil w r It n'i I » m i < j lui.r i 
t h e bundance Canyon Road in h i s a u t o m o b i l e Whi le both p a r t i e s 
a g r e e t h e r e was no c o n t a c t between t h e v e h i c l e s , p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s 
+-hat b e c a u s e of U " i / ir idn | i-at«>< " ' ', i ' I tdt i .dwit 
v e h i c l e c r o s s e d ovui t h e c e n t e r l i n e and e n c r o a c h e d i n t o 
p l a i n t i f t ' s lam. , f o r c i n g p l a i n t i f t t o t a k e e v a s i v e act i ip which 
u l t i m a t e l y led In I In p l a i n t it I In' nig I I H I I I M I MI IIIIM mm ui c) c l e 
and c r a s h i n g on tin1 -iide nt t h e toad The d e f e n d a n t denies ; t h a t 
Ik- e v e r i c t t h i s umi l a n e , and s t a t e s t h a t t h e p l i m t i f i wi 
t i a v M l i n g up I IIH i n n h n n| I 11M rn id iinnll nir ut a i t Jed uhi n lie came 
around one of I.he c u r v e s and saw t h ^ c-d end jr.-- * - ; e h i c , :, 
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Plaintiff attempted to get back into the center of his own lane 
but over corrected, causing him to lose control of his 
motorcycle. (R. 948, pp. 3-5.) 
Facts Relevant to Video-Tape Issue 
The plaintiff hired, among others, Greg DuVal as an 
expert accident reconstructionist. As part of Mr. DuVal's 
reconstruction, and as a portion of the material he relied upon 
in reaching his opinion, he videotaped the Sundance road from the 
point where it intersects with Provo Canyon Road to the point of 
the accident. (R. 944, p. 32.) Further, Mr. DuVal attempted to 
recreate the accident by videotaping a car, similar to the 
defendant's car, coming down the canyon and encroaching into what 
would have been the plaintiff's lane of travel. He then showed a 
series of these reenactments to the plaintiff, who watched the 
video and then pointed out that reenactment which most closely 
portrayed what he remembered. (R. 944, p. 33.) 
Mr. DuVal relied upon this video reenactment, at least 
in part, in reaching his opinions in the matter. He further 
stated that the reconstruction he did in the matter, including 
videotapes, still photographs and diagrams was done because 
visual aids are helpful to the jury (R. 944, p. 24) and that 
these visual aids are illustrative of the road configuration. 
Indeed, the following conversation took place in Mr. DuVal's 
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deposition regarding photographs of the scene which were taken by 
Mr. DuVal: 
QUESTION: You think that this particular 
photograph and the angle at which 
you took the photograph is 
illustrative of that particular 
theory that you have that the road 
suggests or gives one the 
impression that motorists would cut 
the corner or straighten out that 
particular curve? 
ANSWER: I don't think people may think that 
just by seeing the photograph but 
the photograph is there to 
visualize what the area looks like 
so people can see the area where 
the accident did occur. It is an 
aid to the statements made by both 
parties involved and to where we 
can place back the events of Mr. 
Butts/ ("plaintiff'si travel. (R. 
944, pp. 44-5.) (Emphasis added.) 
At trial, during cross examination of Mr. DuVal, the 
defendant attempted to show the videotape produced by Mr. DuVal. 
Plaintiff's counsel objected at which point lengthy arguments 
were given outside the jury's presence. The court ultimately 
ruled that the defendant could show only that portion of the 
video from Provo Canyon Road up the Sundance road to the point of 
the accident. The court ruled that the portion of the videotape 
which attempted to reenact the accident could not be shown. In 
so ruling, the court specifically stated that: 
[A]s far as a video is concerned, the only 
purpose I am receiving that is illustrative 
of the type of road, the condition of the 
road, which seemed to be similar, the 
foliages and the general surrounding 
circumstances of that accident at the time. 
(R. 934, p. 50.) (Emphasis added.) 
The portion of the tape that the court allowed shows 
only the nature of the road and the surrounding foliage, etc. 
There was no attempt to recreate the accident. Indeed, to ensure 
that no portion of the videotape which attempted a reenactment 
was shown, plaintiff's counsel held the remote control and 
stopped the videotape at the point where plaintiff's expert began 
his attempts to reenact the accident. (R. 941, pp. 1-3.) 
Facts Relevant to Worker's Compensation Issue 
The plaintiff testified both in depositions and at 
trial that since the date of the accident, he has not been able 
to return to his previous work with Ray Butts Construction 
Company. (R. 937, p. 14.) Notwithstanding this testimony, 
defendant discovered a medical document dating two and a half 
years after the accident which appeared to be an industrial claim 
for a contusion to the upper arm made while an employee of Ray 
Butts Construction Company. This document was contained in a 
two-volume set of medical records prepared by the plaintiff as a 
trial exhibit. The defendants stipulated to the foundation of 
these medical records and stipulated that they would go to the 
jury. Because the plaintiff had just testified that he had never 
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worked for Ray Butts Construction since the time of the accident, 
nor for any other construction company, defense counsel asked the 
following question for impeachment purposes: 
QUESTION: Mr. Butts, did, in February of 
1990, not quite a year ago, 
February 26, 1990, did you make a 
claim as an employee for Ray Butts 
Construction Company as resulted 
from a contusion to your upper arm? 
ANSWER: Yes, I believe I did. . . . 
(R. 937, p. 15, 1. 19-23.) 
Following this response, defense counsel began to mark 
another exhibit. After the exhibit was marked but before defense 
counsel began its next series of questions, the plaintiff, 
without a pending question, went on to explain that if his memory 
served him correctly that the claim he had made for the contusion 
to his upper arm was because he slipped and fell on ice and it 
was not work related, but because his doctors felt he may have 
fallen in part due to his previous industrial accident, the 
medical expenses were submitted to worker's compensation for 
payment. In response to this unprompted statement, defense 
counsel stated: 
Your honor, I would like the record to 
reflect that the witness had responded to my 
question and that the additional answer was a 
delayed answer and a volunteer answer after 
we were marking an exhibit. 
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(R. 937, p. 16, 1. 8-11.) 
Later, outside the presence of the jury, plaintiff's 
counsel put on the record the bench conference counsel had 
regarding plaintiff's counsel's prior objection to this question. 
Plaintiff's counsel erroneously thought the medical record had 
been put into evidence. In fact, neither that medical record, 
nor any other medical record, was ultimately put into evidence. 
Plaintiff's counsel then objected to the line of questioning 
because it went to the collateral source rule. The court 
ultimately ruled that: 
And the court's ruling had to do with whether 
or not it would go to his credibility, not 
the collateral source rule. In any event, 
the court didn't feel that there was anything 
about the testimony that would indicate any 
amount or anything of that nature. 
(R. 944, p. 10, 1. 12-17.) 
Defense counsel had never questioned plaintiff on this 
medical record prior to trial, nor had plaintiff ever discussed 
this medical record or the industrial claim made in it with 
defense counsel. 
Facts Relevant to the Defendant's Liability Insurance Issue 
The accident occurred on June 18, 1987. (R. 3.) There 
was no contact between the two vehicles, and in fact the 
defendant was only listed as a witness on the police report. The 
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plaintiff never accused the defendant of running him off the 
road, either at the scene at the accident where the two were 
together and talking for approximately 45 minutes, or anytime 
thereafter until he was served with a summons and complaint on 
October 3, 1987, approximately three and a half months after the 
accident. 
Approximately three weeks after plaintiff was injured, 
the defendant switched insurance companies from Allstate 
insurance to State Farm insurance. His purpose for making the 
switch was to save $342 per year in premiums. (R. 934, p. 10.) 
Indeed, in the previous ten years, the defendant had switched 
insurance companies for premium savings no less than ten times. 
Several of these were mid-policy switches. (R. 662.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The plaintiff appeals three issues. The defendant will 
summarize them in the order addressed in appellant's brief. 
Videotape Issue 
Although the plaintiffs refer to the videotape as 
"demonstrative" evidence, the court admitted it for 
"illustrative" purposes only. The videotape, produced by 
plaintiff's own expert witness, merely shows the plaintiff's 
expert witness driving his vehicle up the Sundance Canyon Road to 
the point of the accident. The videotape was shown only to 
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illustrate the general nature of the road, with no attempt to 
distort the view to the advantage of either the plaintiff or 
defendant. Assumably, if there was a distortion, it was 
distorted in favor of the plaintiff, since it was the plaintiff's 
expert who produced the video. 
Utah Rules of Evidence allow the admission of 
videotapes within the bounds set by Utah case law. Utah case law 
specifically approves this illustrative type of videotape as an 
alternative to taking the jury to the road itself for a personal 
viewing. 
Worker's Compensation Issue 
Plaintiff argues that the Court committed reversible 
error because the defendant was allowed to impeach the 
plaintiff's credibility with a medical record the plaintiff 
provided to the defendants in a stipulated pack of medical 
records which was to go to the jury. Within the rules of 
evidence however, the credibility of any witness may be 
impeached. 
Plaintiff testified that he had never worked for Ray 
Butts Construction Company since the time of the accident, yet 
this medical record, which was dated approximately two and a half 
years after the accident, appeared to show an industrial claim 
made for a contusion to the arm, which was paid under the 
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worker's compensation insurance purchased by Ray Butts 
Construction Company. Defense counsel had never discussed this 
document with the plaintiff prior to trial, nor had the plaintiff 
informed defense counsel of any subsequent worker's compensation 
claims. For impeachment purposes only, defense counsel asked if 
the plaintiff had made a claim as an employee with Ray Butts 
Construction Company for an injury to his upper arm. The 
plaintiff answered "yes, I believe I did." This testimony 
impeached his prior testimony that he had never worked for Ray 
Butts Construction Company subsequent to his accident, and 
therefore was proper impeachment of the plaintiff and well within 
the rules of evidence. 
Defendant's Liability Insurance Issue 
Plaintiff argues that because the defendant switched 
insurance companies three weeks after the accident, this was 
somehow a tacit admission of fault for causing the accident and, 
therefore, should be admissible at trial. Defendant switched 
insurance companies because he saved $342.00 per year in 
premiums. (R. 934, p.10, 1.19-22) Defendant switched companies 
three weeks after the accident, and had no idea he was being 
blamed for the accident until he was served with a complaint 
three months after the accident. The defendant had a long 
history of frequently switching insurance companies for premium 
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savings. (R. 662) When it became clear to plaintiff's counsel 
that the defendant had very significant premium savings, 
plaintiff's counsel retreated to the position that it must still 
be a tacit admission of fault because the defendant, at his 
deposition, could not recall the exact date that he switched 
insurance companies. 
It is not surprising that the defendant, without the 
benefit of having any records in front of him, could not recall 
the exact date that he switched insurance companies, given the 
fact that plaintiff's counsel was asking this question seventeen 
months after the date that he switched insurance companies. 
Indeed, plaintiff's counsel made a similar error in estimation. 
Plaintiff's counsel believed that the switch was made two or 
three days after the accident. (R. 948, p. 26, 1. 18.) 
Utah law is very clear on the issue of injecting 
liability insurance into a trial. The court followed the law and 
acted well within its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED ILLUSTRATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE 
ROAD WHERE THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence have long allowed 
"photographs" admitted as evidence. The rule now defines 
photographs to "include still photos, x-ray films, videotapes, 
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and motion pictures." Rule 1001(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. So 
long as the videotape is relevant and its probative value is not 
outweighed by unfair prejudice, it is within the trial court's 
discretion to admit such evidence, and "the general rule 
regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is that the 
trial courts decision will not be overturned in the absence of 
an abuse of discretion." Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, 
Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App. 1989). The Utah Supreme Court 
has further stated that: 
[I]n reviewing questions of admissibility of 
evidence at trial, deference is given to the 
trial court's advantageous position; thus, 
that court's ruling regarding admissibility 
will not be overturned unless it clearly 
appears that the lower court was in error. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corporation, 801 P.2d 920, 923 
(Utah 1990). 
The videotape that was shown to the jury, which was 
produced by the plaintiff's expert witness, showed the 
plaintiff's expert in a vehicle traveling the Sundance Canyon 
Road from the point where it intersects the Provo Canyon Road, 
to the point where the accident occurred. The plaintiff's expert 
traveled within the speed limit for the road, and always stayed 
within his lane of travel. The plaintiff testified that he was 
traveling within the speed limit and within his lane of travel. 
The plaintiff claims that the videotape segment showed the road 
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"before the segment where the accident actually occurred . . . .,f 
In fact, the court ordered that it would be helpful for the jury 
to see the general characteristics of the road as the plaintiff 
approached the scene of the accident. The videotape included the 
scene of the accident* Indeed, the court ordered that the only 
portion of the video that could be shown was that portion where 
"they come up from the highway [Provo Canyon Road], up to the 
point of the impact, to where the accident has occurred." (R. 
934, p. 49, 1. 15-19.) The court specifically excluded that 
portion of the video wherein plaintiff's expert attempted to 
recreate the accident since it was the court's intent only to 
allow into evidence that portion of the video that was 
"illustrative of the type of road, the condition of the road, 
which seems to be similar, the foliages and the general 
surrounding circumstances of that accident at the time." (R. 
934, p. 50, 1. 18-24.) 
The plaintiff attempts to support his argument that the 
video was a distorted view with a 99-year-old case from Florida. 
A more helpful case is the recent Utah Supreme Court case of 
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980). In Brown. the 
defendant was on trial for murder. The Court allowed the state 
to show the jury a videotape of the premises at and around the 
place where the killing took place. The defendant appealed, 
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claiming that the showing of the videotape was prejudicial to the 
defendant in that it was an attempt to reenact the crime, id. at 
266. In reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court stated that "the 
transcript shows that the court admitted the film for 
illustrative purposes only, and as an alternative to a viewing by 
the jury of the area in Redrock." Id. The court ultimately 
ruled that: 
It is merely a film of the area, where the 
killing occurred, including the trailer, the 
sagebrush, and a hole in the ground, none of 
which was at all inflammatory or prejudicial 
to defendant. There is no basis for 
defendant's argument that the court abused 
its discretion in allowing the jury to view 
the film. 
Id. 
As in the Brown case, the court in the instant case 
allowed the jury to view this video of the one-mile stretch of 
the road leading up to the accident scene as an alternative to 
taking the jury to view the scene in person. Defense counsel 
moved to have the jury taken to that canyon road so that they 
could view the general characteristics of the road leading up to 
the accident if the court was not inclined to allow that limited 
portion of the videotape to be shown. (R. 934, p. 36, 1. 14-25.) 
While plaintiff's counsel argues that the videotape 
cannot act as the human eye and, therefore, is misleading, the 
same arguments apply to the photographs presented and allowed 
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into evidence by the plaintiff's attorney. Indeed, plaintiff's 
attorney submitted into evidence an aerial view of the road in 
question, which shows long portions of the road on both sides of 
the accident. (R. 703, plaintiff's Exhibit 10.) While plaintiff 
argues that the videotape cannot adequately show the changes in 
elevations, etc. that the human eye would see, it can be hardly 
be disputed that an aerial photograph of a road shows virtually 
no changes in elevations or vision obstructions. Not 
surprisingly, the court allowed those photographs in because they 
were "illustrative" of the road at and about where the accident 
occurred. The videotape was admitted for the same reasons. 
Plaintiff has put no evidence before this court to 
support his claim that the court abused its discretion in 
allowing the videotape in for illustrative purposes. The court 
reviewed the videotape in camera and in the court's discretion 
felt it appropriate to show a portion of the videotape. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED DEFENSE COUNSEL TO IMPEACH 
PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY WITH MEDICAL RECORDS PREPARED AND 
SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff argues that because defense counsel was 
allowed to pursue a line of questioning about a 1990 work related 
claim, the court committed reversible error. However, the record 
clearly reveals that this was a proper line of questioning which 
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led to the impeachment of the plaintiff's credibility. Any party 
may impeach the credibility of a witness. Rule 607, Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff testified at trial that 
since the time of the accident, he had never been employed with 
Ray Butts Construction Company. (R. 937, p. 14, 1. 2 0-2 3.) 
However, in a two volume book of medical records compiled by 
plaintiff's counsel as a trial exhibit, there was a medical bill 
dated February 26, 1990 which appeared to be a work related claim 
made by the plaintiff for a contusion to the arm while an 
employee of Ray Butts Construction Company. Neither plaintiff 
nor plaintiff's counsel had discussed this claim with the 
defendant prior to trial. When defense counsel began to inquire 
into this claim, plaintiff's counsel objected. Plaintiff's only 
objection, held at the bench, was that plaintiff's answer may 
include references to worker's compensation benefits. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not inform the court or defense counsel 
that this may have been a slip and fall injury that was related 
to the 1987 accident. Plaintiff's counsel obviously did not know 
this may have been a claim related to the 1987 incident since 
after the court allowed defense counsel to ask whether the 
plaintiff had made a claim in 1990 as an employee of Ray Butts 
Construction Company, the plaintiff answered that he did make a 
claim in 1990 as an employee for Ray Butts Construction Company. 
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(R. 937, p. 15, 1. 19-23.) This clearly impeached plaintiff's 
prior testimony that he had not worked for Ray Butts Construction 
Company since 1987. Only after a delay in the trial proceedings 
while defense counsel was marking another exhibit did the 
plaintiff offer additional information that this was possibly a 
claim for an aggravation to his 1987 accident. Certainly, 
defense counsel had no indication that this weis an aggravation to 
a preexisting claim since the plaintiff himself first testified 
that it was not due to a preexisting accident. Common sense 
dictates that defense counsel would not want to bring to the 
jury's attention an aggravation to a preexisting injury that the 
plaintiff claims was caused by the defendant. The line of 
questioning was allowed by the court because the court felt that: 
The courts ruling had to do with whether or 
not it would be going to his credibility, not 
to the collateral source rule. In any event, 
the court didn't feel that there was anything 
about the testimony that would indicate any 
amount or anything of that nature. 
(R. 954, p. 10, 1. 12-17.) 
Although plaintiff cites to foreign jurisdictions which 
have ruled that under certain circumstances the introduction of 
worker's compensation may constitute reversible error, the 
controlling Utah case on this issue is Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 
P.2d 121 (Utah 1965). Regarding the legal question of injecting 
the issue of insurance into trial, the court in Robinson stated: 
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It is the responsibility of the trial court 
to rule upon questions which arise concerning 
whether [evidence of insurance] has prevented 
a party from having a fair trial; and to take 
whatever corrective measures he deems 
necessary, including the granting of a 
mistrial where that is required. Due to the 
fact that this is primarily his 
responsibility; and that he is in a position 
of advantage to observe the appearance, 
demeanor and reactions of all persons 
concerned, and the result which eventuates, 
his ruling on such matters should be looked 
upon with indulgence and should not be 
disturbed unless it clearly appears that he 
has abused his discretion. 
Id, at 124 (Emphasis added). 
In another case, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"the mere mention of insurance does not in all cases lead to the 
conclusion that the jury was prejudiced, or likely to be to such 
an extent that a fair trial could not be had." C.R. Owens 
Trucking Corporation v. Stewart, 509 P.2d 821, 823 (Utah 1973). 
Because this was the only mention of worker's 
compensation, made only peripherally by the plaintiff himself, 
and because the question was asked for the purpose of impeaching 
the plaintiff's prior testimony and not for collateral reasons, 
the question was proper and did not result in prejudice to the 
plaintiff. Interestingly, the two binder book of medical records 
compiled and provided to the defendant by the plaintiff as a 
trial exhibit included at least 39 documents which evidenced 
payment by the worker's compensation fund of Utah. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PLAINTIFF7S EFFORT TO PUT ON 
DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
Rule 411, Utah Rules of Evidence, states that: 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured 
against liability is not admissible upon the 
issue of whether he acted negligently or 
otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence of 
insurance against liability when offered for 
other purposes, such as proof of agency, 
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice 
of a witness. 
The Utah courts have been very consistent in their 
directions that "the question of insurance is immaterial and 
should not be injected into the trial; and it is the duty of both 
counsel and the court to guard against it." Tiaz v. Procter, 591 
P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979); Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121, 
12 3 (Utah 1965). Indeed, the court in warning both counsel and 
the court to guard against the injection of the issue of 
insurance in a trial went on to state that "we could not make it 
anymore definite unless we said damn it." Young v. Barney, 433 
P.2d 846, 849, Footnote 8 (Utah 1967). Plaintiff's counsel 
claims that he was entitled to put on evidence of defendant's 
liability insurance because the defendant switched insurance 
companies three weeks after the accident occurred. This, he 
claims, is evidence that the defendant knew that he was involved 
in an "at fault" accident. 
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The records that were presented to the court in an 
evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence clearly proved 
that the defendant was charged $342.00 less in premiums per year 
when he switched insurance companies. (R. 934, p. 10, 1. 19-22.) 
Other documents presented to the court also evidenced that over 
the past ten years, defendant switched insurance companies at 
least ten times, and each time it was in an effort to lower his 
premium rate. (R. 662.) The evidence also reveals that the 
defendant had absolutely no notice that a claim was being made 
against him at the time that he switched insurance companies. 
The accident occurred on June 18, 1987. It was a non-contact 
accident and the defendant was only listed as a witness on the 
police report. The plaintiff made no claims against the 
defendant at the scene of the accident. In fact, the plaintiff 
made no claims against the defendant to the defendant himself, 
the responding police officer, or the responding paramedic, all 
of whom were in the plaintiff's presence for at least 4 5 minutes. 
The paramedic who treated the plaintiff testified that the 
plaintiff was conscious, lucid and always able to correctly 
respond to all questions asked of him by the police officer and 
the paramedic himself. (R. 940, p. 21, 1. 13-25.) Thus, the 
defendant had no indication that a claim was being made against 
him at the time he switched insurance companies. 
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Finally, plaintiff makes the tortured argument that 
because the defendant testified in his deposition that he thought 
he switched insurance companies "several months" after the 
accident and, in fact, it was three weeks after the accident that 
this is somehow a tacit admission that he was involved in an "at 
fault" accident. The defendant was asked when he switched 
insurance companies 17 months after he switched insurance 
companies, and without the benefit of any documents in front of 
him to refresh his recollection. His answer of "several months11 
is certainly reasonable given the year and a half that had 
transpired since the time he switched insurance companies. 
Indeed, if the defendant is to be faulted for this estimation, 
then plaintiff's counsel must be similarly faulted in that he 
represented to the defendant in the defendant's deposition that 
the defendant had actually switched insurance companies two or 
three days after the accident occurred. (R. 948, p. 26, 1. 12-
18.) 
After the lengthy evidentiary hearing the court ruled 
that: (1) the defendant did not know that anyone was assessing 
fault on him at the time he switched insurance companies; (2) the 
defendant indeed paid a lower premium after switching companies; 
(3) the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff was so 
tenuous that it "flies in the teeth of Rule 411, URE; and (4) 
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that any probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect 
on the defendant. (R. 934, pp. 30-31.) 
There is simply no evidence before this court that 
would justify this court's reversal of the trial court's clear 
and reasoned discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff appeals based on three issues. The first 
is the introduction by the defendant of a videotape produced by 
the plaintiff's expert witness. The videotape was reviewed by 
the court in camera and only that portion of the videotape which 
showed the road leading up to, and including the point where the 
accident occurred, was allowed to be shown. The court 
specifically ruled that it was to be shown for illustrative 
purposes only since there was no attempt to recreate the accident 
in the videotape. The plaintiff's expert who produced this 
videotape relied upon it in reaching his conclusions and because 
it only showed the general condition of the road, and in 
particular the winding nature of the road up to and including the 
accident scene, it was not prejudicial and, therefore, was 
properly admitted. 
The plaintiff also complains that the court erroneously 
allowed defense counsel to impeach plaintiff using a medical 
record compiled by the plaintiff and provided to the defendant as 
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a trial exhibit meant to go to the jury. In that the plaintiff 
testified that he had never worked for Ray Butts Construction 
Company after the time of the accident, and the medical record 
provided to the defendant seemed to indicate very clearly that he 
in fact did make a claim for an injury to his upper arm as an 
employee of Ray Butts Construction Company two and a half years 
after the accident, it was proper under the rules of evidence 
that defense counsel be allowed to impeach the plaintiff with 
this information. Indeed, after the court ruled that it was a 
proper line of questioning, the plaintiff responded that he did 
make a claim for an injury to his upper arm as an employee for 
Ray Butts Construction Company in 1990. Defense counsel did not 
ask if the plaintiff was entitled to worker's compensation nor 
did defense counsel discuss any amounts received by plaintiff in 
worker's compenscition benefits. Therefore, it was a proper line 
of questioning and plaintiff was not prejudiced. 
Finally, the plaintiff argues that because the 
defendant switched insurance companies three weeks after the 
accident that this was a tacit admission by the defendant that he 
was involved in an at fault accident and, therefore, the 
plaintiff should be entitled to discuss defendant's liability 
insurance with the jury. In fact, the evidence clearly showed 
that the defendant switched insurance companies because he saved 
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$342 per year in premiums. The record also clearly indicates 
that the defendant had a history of switching insurance companies 
frequently to save insurance premiums, not because he was 
constantly involved in at fault accidents. Indeed, the defendant 
had no indication that he was being blamed for anything at the 
time he switched insurance companies. 
The court's rulings on the issues appealed by the 
plaintiff were proper rulings or at worst, harmless error and, 
therefore, the trial court's final judgment should be affirmed. 
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Roles of Evidence 
(1971) except that "sarprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice1* as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise.'' 
See also Smith v. £stelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 ?J2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Rule 411. Liability insurance. 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not ad-
missible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. 
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against 
liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, 
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Tkis rule is inson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 
the federal rule, verbatim. The proviaiona of 121 (1965); Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50,93 P.2d 
this rule are comparable to Rule 54, Utah 680 (1939). 
Rules of Evidence (1971) and case law. CL Rob-
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the 
party calling him. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is similar to 
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
ANALYSIS 
Ability to remember. 
Collateral issue. 
Extrinsic evidence. 
Cited. 
Ability to remember. 
It was error for the court to prevent cross-
examination that probed a robbery victim's 
possible inability to remember events that 
might have been exculpatory. State v. Morrell, 
803 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct. Apo. 1990). 
Collateral issue. 
As to what constitutes a collateral issue 
upon which a party may not be impeached, see 
State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977). 
Extrinsic evidence. 
Extrinsic evidence relevant to issues of cred-
ibility is admissible. State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498 (Utah 1986). 
Cited in State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 
(Utah 1977). 
ARTICLE X. 
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, 
AND PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Rule 1001. Definitions. 
For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable: 
(1) Writings and recordings. "Writings" and "recordings" consist of 
letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, 
typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, 
mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation. 
(2) Photographs. "Photographs" include still photographs, X-ray 
films, video tapes, and motion pictures. 
(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or 
recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a 
person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the 
negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or 
similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to 
reflect the data accurately, is an "original." 
(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same 
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of 
photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical 
or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equiv-
alent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. The definition of 
"writing" in subdivision (1) corresponds in sub-
stance with Rule 1(12), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). 
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